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Since coming to Santa Barbara, my job 
description has been “comparative East 
Asianist,” rather than historian of China or 
Japan; as a result, I have had to do a great deal 
of reading in the histories of the other countries 
in the region. Among the many things that have 
struck me in this connection over the past few 
years are not only how so much of what I 
initially learned in Chinese history classes has 
startling resonances with the other major areas 
influenced by Chinese culture (everybody 
knows that), but also how remarkably similar 
was the conceptualization of pressing issues in 
those countries with China as well as how 
much less extraordinary China’s historical experience becomes through 
comparison. The diﬀ erences as well as the similarities are thrown in a fasci-
nating relief and potentially tell us much about not only high Chinese culture 
but also the social and economic systems in which it found a home.
 I am still very much in the process of sorting all this out toward writing 
a much longer work in the general area. Here I would like to focus tightly on 
two manifestations of the larger problem: the linkage between the rise of 
nationalism and the emergence of the vernacular as a literary vehicle; and the 
East West mix in the conceptions of modernization. These issues were faced 
by all four East Asian civilizations and in remarkably similar ways.
Opinion Forum
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 Let me say just one further thing by way of introduction. I think this sort 
of comparative analysis, whether or not I do it well, leads us to far more 
important and interesting conclusions than does the imposition of all the 
foreign origin theories that have been sweeping the ﬁ eld of late—the infesta-
tion has been most grotesque in the Japan ﬁ eld in this regard. By the same 
token, I want strongly and openly to disassociate myself from the regional-
cultural approach that has been applied principally by social scientists using 
hypocoristics like NICS and NIES and Paciﬁ c Rim and whatever else.
Modernization and the Rise of the Vernacular
 Many scholars in East Asia and elsewhere have identiﬁ ed the rise of 
nationalism with the transformations characterized by the modern experience. 
Nationalism has usually been seen as a positive force in China, as well as in 
Vietnam and Korea, whereas in Japan it has been seen as antecedent to 
imperialism. I think a more meaningful comparison, which is impossible 
here, would start with a level playing ﬁ eld and look at Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, and Vietnamese nationalism in comparative terms, examine their 
mutual interactions, and look at the consequences of their emergence over the 
entire course of the 20th century, not just the ﬁ rst few decades.
 One manifestation of nationalism that can be found in all four East Asian 
nations is the rise of the vernacular in its relationship both to literary Chinese 
culture (even in China) and to modern political movements. In China the rise 
of baihua (the vernacular) in the New Culture Movement is usually under-
stood as part of the rising tide of nationalism, demonstrating a concern on the 
part of early Chinese radicals to bring culture to the people, and usually 
ignoring the fact that China already had traditions of vernacular drama and 
ﬁ ction that had made major strides several centuries before Hu Shi and Chen 
Duxiu claimed to be pioneering it.
 Scholars have tended to stress to excess the diﬀ erences between baihua 
and wenyan(literary Chinese), probably because the latter is so extraordinarily 
diﬃ  cult but in comparison to what readers and writers in the other countries 
of East Asia were working with, the diﬀ erences recede rapidly. After all, both 
baihua and wenyan are Chinese; they are members of the same language 
group; they occupied clearly delineated spheres as languages; and while use 
of one or the other might raise political or cultural issues, it brought into 
question no issues of national or ethnic identity. The eﬀ ort to bring baihua 
into a monopolizing position as linguistic hegemon early in the 20th century 
reveals much more a conscious political assault on the elite culture that had 
so long used (many diﬀ erent varieties of) wenyan to communicate.
 In the other countries of East Asia, what had taken one step in China 
would require two or more steps. First, a native written language had to be 
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invented to compete with the imported literary Chinese—this occurred before 
the putative modern period—and later, a written vernacular had to be devel-
oped to contest with both the domestic literary language and Chinese. But we 
should keep ﬁ rmly in mind that, until recent times, Chinese literary culture 
was literary culture to a large extent, and even into our own century it 
reminded the medium of international discourse within East Asia.
 The Japanese were not the ﬁ rst people on the Chinese periphery to imbibe 
Sinic culture, but they were the ﬁ rst to develop their own written language, 
the kana syllabaries, in general use among the Heian elite by at least the early 
10th century.1
 Initially, kana were considered ﬁ t only for women and were known also 
as onna moji (women’s script), whereas Chinese characters remained the realm 
of men and were called otoko moji (men’s script). But this distinction was 
never an inseparable divide; high-born women often learned Chinese, and 
men did in fact write, on occasion, in kana.
 Skipping ahead to the Edo period, we still ﬁ nd women primarily writing 
in kana and men using both mediums as well as mixtures, though Confucian 
scholars often wrote in Kanbun (literary Chinese) or prepared versions of their 
writings in both Kanbun and bungo (literary Japanese), and some even 
managed to have their Kanbun works circulate in Qing China (as did some 
Koreans and Vietnamese). In response to the need for a uniform educational 
curriculum taught nationwide in an accessible style, a movement developed 
over the course of the 19th century to bring the written Japanese language 
into accord with the vernacular. It aroused acrimonious debate. In 1866, 
Maejima Hisoka called for the complete abolition of Chinese characters from 
Japanese textbooks. In part such calls were eﬀ orts to spread education, in part 
they reﬂ ected a rising aspiration for Japan to ﬁ nd its own distinctive identity 
separate from Sinic culture.2
 1 Roy Andrew Miller, The Japanese Language (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1967), pp.120‒21, 124‒26.
 2 Nanette Twine, “The Genbunitchi Movement: Its Origin, Development, and 
Conclusion.” Monumenta Nipponica 33.3 (Autumn 1978), pp.333, 337. See also her 
book, Language and the Modern State: the Reform of Written Japanese (London: 
Routledge, 1991). The whole picture is muddled, as all historical pictures are, by 
the fact the some of the most extreme and aniti-bakufu activists, like Yoshida Shōin 
and his teacher Sakuma Shōzan were dedicated Kangakusha (scholars of Chinese 
learning) who hoped to bring a Japan derailed by a corrupt and inept bakufu back 
on a proper Confucian course. See Masuda Wataru, Seigaku tōzen to chūgoku jijō: 
‘zassho sakki’ [The eastern spread of Western learning and conditions in China: 
Notes on “Various Books”] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1979), pp.31‒46. My English 
translation of this marvelous book is being published serially in Sino-Japanese 
Studies. For these pages, see Sino-Japanese Studies 3.1 (November 1990), pp.36‒46. 
Chinese friends have informed me that a Chinese translation is also underway.
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 The movement took the name genbun itchi (combining the vernacular and 
literary languages). In its initial stages, it emphasized the great value of a 
vernacular in everyday life. Later, in its better known phase, it became the 
medium for the development of a modern Japanese literature, ﬁ rst and fore-
most in the pioneering vernacular style of Futabatei Shimei, who published 
Japan’s ﬁ rst modern novel in 1887.3 For all the many eﬀ orts to bring the 
written language into harmony with the vernacular in Japan, though, even 
when Kanbun was most on the defensive, we see few or no demands for the 
Japanese people to stop writing Chinese characters altogether because they 
were Chinese; Kanji may have come from China, but they had long become 
the shared property of all East Asians. We should note as well that this was 
precisely the period in which the famous 1000 or more two-character neolo-
gisms were being coined in Meiji Japan and imported back into China, an 
event that helped create the vernacular Chinese language.4
 The Japanese never resorted to Kanbun for ﬁ ction, perhaps because 
Japanese ﬁ ction owed its origins to women, and women wrote primarily in 
kana. Of course, the Chinese themselves never developed a sustained tradi-
tion of wenyan ﬁ ction either. But they were not the only countries in East 
Asia. There was recently published a seven-volume series titled (in Chinese) 
Yuenan Hanwen xiaoshuo congkan. The series represents the bulk of the 
extant novels written by Vietnamese in literary Chinese, usually based on 
Chinese vernacular ﬁ ction or drama and Vietnamized (by changing place 
names, personal names, and settings). Before the Vietnamese developed their 
own written language, known as chū’ nôm (or nôm), in the 13th century, and 
before the Koreans invented the han’gŭl alphabet in the 15th century, and 
indeed well afterward in both cases, both used literary Chinese as the medium 
for written ﬁ ction. A recent Korean scholar’s estimate puts the number of 
extant novels written by Koreans in literary Chinese at about 600. In fact, the 
high point of nôm lyric poetry came only in the 18th century, and han’gŭl 
literature really dates from the 17th century.5
 3 NaneteTwine, “The Genbunitchi Movement,” pp.339, 342, 350, 353‒54; George 
Sansom, The Western World and Japan (New York: Knopf, 1950), p.403; Andō 
Hikotarō, “Miyajima Daihachi to Futabatei Shimei,” in Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku 
[Modern Japan and China], ed. Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hashikawa Bunzō (Tokyo: 
Asahi shinbun sha, 1974), pp.125‒43.
 4 Tam Yue-him (Tan Ruqian), “Xiandai Hanyu de Riyu wailaici jiqi souji he bianren 
wenti” [Japanese Loanwords in contemporary Chinese and the issues involved in 
collecting and recognizing them], in his Jindai Zhong-Ri wenhua guanxi yanjiu 
[Studies in modern Sino-Japanese cultural relations] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Riben 
yanjiusuo, 1986), pp.327‒49
 5 Tanaka Yūko, “‘Nihon Chūgoku Betonamu” [Japan, China, Vietnam], Gekkan Shinika 
2.2 (February 1991), pp.8‒10.
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 Koreans developed their own written language much later than the 
Japanese or the Vietnamese. King Sejong’s explicit purpose in having a 
written Korean language devised was to enable his people to express them-
selves in their everyday lives in a medium of their own, because Chinese, he 
believed, was so diﬃ  cult for them. The Korean historian Yi Ki-baek has 
termed the han’gŭl alphabet “the proudest cultural achievement of the Korean 
people.” While the government and the Confucian yangban elite continued to 
use literay Chinese, many works of a wide variety—including women’s writ-
ings–now began to use han’gŭl.6
 Traditionalists were never particularly happy with han’gŭl, and han’gŭl 
was explicitly used by patriotic groups from the late-19th century as a way to 
make their publications accessible to large numbers of people, just as the 
baihua movements would attempt several decades later in China. The founder 
of the Korean vernacular movement Chu Sigyong, aimed at “ending aristo-
cratic cultural slavery to Chinese culture.”7 He was not attacking the Chinese 
or even their culture but rather the elite in his own society for trying to 
remain a class apart from and above ordinary Koreans. Past Chinese dynas-
ties may have demanded tribute, but the inferiority complex attached to the 
idea of sadae (serving the great) was, like the two-character term itself, a 
Korean innovation. Under the Japanese colonial regime from 1910, only the 
Japanese language was taught in Korean schools, and thus the thrust of any 
movement to keep Korean alive was nationalistic by deﬁ nition. With Japan’s 
defeat in 1945, the nation returned as a whole to han’gŭl (mixed with 
Chinese characters in South Korea, though fewer than in postwar Japan, and 
solely han’gŭl in North Korea).
 The Vietnamese case hears similarities with Korea and Japan, but 
Vietnamese followed an even more tortuous path. I noted that Vietnamese 
invented their own written language, nôm, in the 13th century. An individual 
nôm character was usually created out of two Chinese characters, giving it the 
appearance to Chinese-trained eyes of familiarity and strangeness all at once, 
much like the Xixia script. Nôm was arguably more easily integrated with 
Chinese than kana or han’gŭl because, while Japanese and Korean are highly 
inﬂ ected, S-O-V languages, Vietnamese more closely resembles the lack of 
inﬂ ection in Chinese although with an altogether diﬀ erent word order. There 
was no division of language usage along gender lines, though literary Chinese 
 6 Ki-baikLee, A New History of Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1984), pp.192‒93, 244; Gari Ledyard, “The Korean Language Reform of 1446: The 
Origin, Background and Early History of the Korean Alphabet,” Ph.D. diss., 
University of California, Berkely, 1966.
 7 Michael Edson Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920‒1925 
(Seatle: University of Washington Press, 1988), p.26, quotation on p.34
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(Hán văn) was used by Vietnamese Confucians for “serious literature” and 
nôm for “pleasure.”8
 Like the conservative yangban who disliked use of han’gŭl. Emperor 
Minhmang of the Nguyĕn tried to oust nôm from oﬃ  cial documents at court, 
largely to bring order to the Vietnamese central government. Still, nôm 
remained in use in elementary education (often to facilitate the teaching of 
Confucianism to youngsters) and in literature, undoubtedly because it was the 
closest thing to a written vernacular that the Vietnamese had. At the same 
time, nôm had the capacity to undermine the state orthodox culture or at least 
oﬀ er alternative avenues for expression closer to native feelings.9
 In the 17th century, the famous missionary Alexandre de Rhodes devised 
a romanization for vernacular Vietnamese, later modiﬁ ed and dubbed quõc 
ngũ’, a two-syllable expression that can be found in all four East Asian 
countries, meaning “national language” and hence four diﬀ erent things. As a 
medium of written discourse, however, only under the French colonial regime 
in the latter half of the 19th century did quõć ngũ’ come into its own. The 
French authorities saw it as a means of severing Vietnam culturally from the 
rest of the Sinic sphere, because they wanted to draw the Vietnamese elite 
into the French sphere. They hoped that with the continued use of quõć ngũ’ 
the texts of the literary Chinese heritage would recede into the dusty past.
 Logically precise, but wrong! In the hands of Vietnamese reformers, 
nationalists, and revolutionaries, quõć ngũ’ —a complex alphabet in which 
the tones are written as diacriticals but still far simpler to learn than an 
ideographic language (be it Chinese or nôm)—though initially hated because 
of its origins, became the medium of vernacular access directly to the 
Vietnamese people. Within a generation, by the early years of the 20th 
century, quõć ngũ newspapers and journals began appearing in major cities, 
and quõć ngũ’ was closely linked to rising nationalism and radicalism.10
 8 Alexander Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of 
Nguyen and Ch’ing Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), PP.51‒53, 335; Wen You, “Lun 
Zinan (Chũ’ Nôm) zhi Zuzhi jiqi yu Hanzi Zhi Guanshe” [On the organization of 
Chũ Nôm and its relationship to Chinese characters], Yanjing xuebao 14 (December 
1933), pp.201‒42; Nguyễn Đình Hòa, “Chũ Nôm: The Demotic System of Writing 
in Vietnam”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 79.4 (October-December 
1959), pp.270‒74
 9 Alexander Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, pp.54‒58; David G. Marr, 
Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920‒1945 (Berkely: Univeristy of California Press, 
1981), pp.141‒44.
10 Alexander Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp.78‒79; Dvid G. Marr, Vietnamese 
Anticolonialism, 1885‒1925 (Berkely: Univeristy of California Press, 1971), pp.214
‒15; David Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, pp.145‒46; Hue-Tam Ho Tai, 
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 In addition to having two languages of their own (nôm and quõć ngũ’) 
and one on long-term loan from the north, the French conquest introduced yet 
another language necessary for social advancement. Unlike colonial Korea, 
where the Japanese banned the teaching of the native tongue, the French 
encouraged both quõć ngũ’ and French. While French was the language of the 
hated conqueror, the Vietnamese had had a long experience in the use of a 
language borrowed from a hated conqueror. Furthermore, French was indeed 
the language of an oppressive, unwelcome regime, but it also turned  out—
upon further investigation—to be the language of Victor Hugo, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, and 1789. Major debates ensued in the 1910s and 1920s over 
which language—French or quõć ngũ’ —was appropriate for Vietnamese to 
write in, while literary Chinese and nôm did in fact gradually decline in 
usage.11 All modern Vietnamese nationalists and radicals who came of age in 
the ﬁ rst half of the 20th century have been at least bilingual in French and 
Vietnamese; many (including Hô Chí Minh) knew a fair amount of Chinese 
as well.
 Of the four East Asian countries, then, China was the last to adopt the 
use of the vernacular as a means of reaching the masses in the modern 
period. The extent to which May Fourth intellectuals may have been inﬂ u-
enced by China’s neighbors, perhaps through contacts made in Japan, remains 
an important scholarly desideratum. Many of the leaders of the New Culture 
Movement had been students in Japan; and Liang Qichao, who lived in Japan 
for fourteen years and whose writings were highly inﬂ uential among Chinese 
and Vietnamese there and later at home, was principally responsible for 
encouraging linguistic borrowing from the new, rich Meiji vocabulary. I think 
a crucial link here is the rise of a modern, vernacular press in all the coun-
tries of East Asia.
Mixing East with West in Modernization Schemes
Another issue for comparative analysis is the manner in which the elites in 
each of the four major East Asian countries envisioned the modernizing 
process, the project of borrowing from the West while retaining the core of 
their own native civilization. In China this attitude is usually summed up by 
a phrase attributed—I think incorrectly—to Zhang Zhidong: Zhongxue wei ti, 
Xixue wei yong. In this late-19th-century conception, Western technology 
Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), pp.22‒23, 49‒50, 112
11 David Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, pp.146‒50, where these linguistic issues 
are masterfully laid out. The best overall book on the complexity of linguistic 
choices for Vietnamese is John Defrancis, Colonialism and Language Policy in Viet 
Nam (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1977).
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would be grafted onto or simply used to protect Chinese civilization. It was 
an implicit statement of China’s weakness in science and technology, though 
turned around so that “science” appeared unessential to what was basic or ti. 
Several decades later, Chinese students were still calling for science (Sai 
xiansheng), though they were now linking it with a failing at the core of 
Chinese culture, the lack of democracy (De xiansheng).
 In the generation before Zhang Zhidong and the self-strengthening move-
ment, Japanese reformers were similarly looking for a way to open their 
country, save it from the fate visited upon China, and yet preserve their own 
ethicomoral values. Sakuma Shōzan coined the term that typiﬁ ed this 
approach: Tōyō dōtoku Seiyō geijutsu (East Asian ethics and Western tech-
nology). Since the Chinese movement apparently failed to produce modern-
ization, its bifurcated approach of mixing East and West in discrete spheres 
has been seen as a failure by some, reactionary by others, while the perceived 
“success” of the Meiji Restoration has aﬀ orded the Japanese approach a more 
hospitable reception. However, Professor Min Tu-gi of Seoul National 
University has demonstrated the remarkable similarity in the intellectual 
frameworks of the two.12 If something went wrong with the yangwu move-
ment in China, in other words, it must lay elsewhere.
 Another slogan coined in the Meiji period, though less widely used, was 
Wakon Yōsai (Japanese soul, Western talent). This phrase derives interestingly 
in a much older one, allegedly dating to the Heian period, Wakon Kansai 
(Japanese soul, Chinese talent). In the earlier era, when Japan had been for 
borrowing heavily from China, the slogan was meant to remind Japanese of 
the need to retain their inner core. Adapted to the later 19th century, Yō 
replaced kan, though the force of the slogan in the respective ages of 
“modernization” remained remarkably similar.
 We ﬁ nd a similar development in Korea. In the aftermath of several 
decades of anti-foreign calls by the yangban elite to ‘reject heterodoxy’ 
(ch’oksa), inspired by Western and later Japanese aggression, Koreans of a 
self-styled ‘enlightenment’ (kaehwa) mind began in the 1880s to see the need 
for some accomodation with things Western while retaining a basic 
Confucian core. This new idea materialized in the phrase Tongdo Sogi 
12 Min Tu-ki (Min Tu-gi), “Chinese ‘Principle’ and Western ‘Utility’, a Reassessment,” 
in his National Polity and Local Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989), pp.51‒62, 85‒88. The salient diﬀ erence between the Chinese and Japanese 
slogans for self-strengthening should be noted; namely, the moral values for be 
preserved in the Japanese case were identiﬁ ed with East Asia and this assumed a 
Sinic core, while in the Chinese case the fundament was identiﬁ ed with China 
alone. Both cases bespeak the ongoing acceptance of a common Sinic basis to the 
entire East Asian ethic realm.
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(Eastern ways, Western instruments).13 Again, the identiﬁ cation of this dual 
approach to modernization with enlightenment thought and a rejection of 
xenophobia bears a strong resemblance to the Chinese and Japanese cases. 
Korea, though, bore the added brunt of being the victim not only of Western 
expansionism but Japanese as well.
 In 19th-century Vietnam, a permutation of this slogan was not bandied 
about by the elite, but debate over this tiyong (or thếkụng) style of thinking 
was possibly more trenchant than elsewhere throughout East Asia. Being a 
French colony from the 1860s, the issue of whether to resist the French 
wholeheartedly or adopt their technology so as to be able to expel them at a 
later date was of much greater immediacy. The Chinese, Japanese, and 
Koreans were facing a threat of future humiliation; the Vietnamese already 
had to deal with a conqueror. As Ralph Smith summed it up some years ago: 
“What attitude ought the Vietnamese to take toward their conquerors? Could 
anything be gained by cooperation with the West, by seeking to learn from 
the West? And if so, what was the proper relationship between the culture and 
institutions of the past, and the ideas and institutions to be borrowed from the 
West?”14
Conclusions
More generally, I think our understanding of many other themes in the evolu-
tion of modern China can be enriched through this sort of comparative 
perspective. Being on China’s cultural periphery has allowed the other 
nations of East Asia a range of options not always available in China, 
although it has often come at considerable psychological, even physical cost. 
Using Chinese characters as opposed to a native written language or speaking 
a language of foreign origin as opposed one’s native tongue were rarely 
choices that Chinese intellectuals were compelled to make, even during 
periods of foreign conquest, with the possible exception of the early decades 
of the Qing. As a result, the issues such concerns forced to the surface―
issues of national and cultural identity, issues of determining where one’s own 
culture ended and Chinese culture began, major issues of self-deﬁ nition―
13 Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, pp.299, 302; Korea, Old and New: A History 
(Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990), pp.208‒209.
14 Ralph Smith, Viet-Nam and the West (London: Heinemann, 1968), pp.25, 30, quota-
tion on p.29; Alexander Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, pp.200, 261. In 
discussing the Vietnamese students sent to study in China and Japan in the move-
ment pioneered by reformer Phan Bôi Cháu from 1905, Professor Tai notes that “the 
students brought by Phan to China or Japan had conceived of Western learning 
essentially as a technique to ﬁ ght colonialism; they sought to contain ideas in a 
strictly functionalist framework, leaving intact their fundamental values and sense of 
self.” Tai, Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution, p.170.
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had, I would argue, less of an impact on the Chinese until perhaps the 
confrontation with the West in the 19th century. By the time, Japan, Korea, 
and Vietnam had been working through these kinds of self-deﬁ nitional prob-
lems for centuries, even millennia (the Japanese still are). China simply had 
no “other” against which to see itself.
 The overwhelming inﬂ uence of high Sini culture in the other countries 
of East Asia was not only incredibly beneﬁ cial to their individual maturations 
as societies and cultures, but it also provided a natural straw-person against 
which a nativist movement more directly concerned with issues of self-deﬁ -
nition could react. As Maruyama Masao and many others since have shown 
for Japan, the kokugaku (nativist) movement also shared much with the Sinic 
tradition at which it took aim in Japan; that it perceived its lack of a written 
textual traditions as a lacuna was due to the fact that both the major conti-
nental imports, Confucianism and Buddhism, had readily accessible and very 
thick canons. Without China as “other”, nativism had no meaning in Japan.
 No comparable movements developed in Korea or Vietnam, though the 
absence of a native response to Chinese culture of this sizable sort means 
neither that such movements were snuﬀ ed out in their infancy nor that 
Chinese culture simply overwhelmed the Vietnamese and the Koreans. Both 
are logical possibilities, but much more likely are two other scenarios. First, 
as the case of Korea seems to make clearer, Confucian culture on Korean soil 
was never seen as an unwelcome or alien intruder. It was not perceived in the 
same manner as Japanese eﬀ orts in the ﬁ rst half of the 20th century to replace 
Korean culture with Japan’s own. Confucianism was “international.” Second, 
as the case of Vietnam seems to make clearer, Confucian culture barely 
reached below the level of the elite, having little to do with everyday lives of 
the agricultural populace for a variety of complex reasons. The Vietnamese 
elite did indeed engage in the discourse of Neo-Confucian commentaries and 
criticism across what we would now call national boundaries, but not (appar-
ently) as proliﬁ cally as their East Asian neighbors.15
 Students of Chinese history need not all become comparativists to realize 
that fresh light is cast on China’s historical evolution through comparisons 
15 On Vietnamese Confucianism, see Tsuboi Yoshiharu, “Vetonaumu ni okeru Jukyō” 
[Neo-Confucianism in Vietnam], Shisō, 792 (June 1990), pp.163‒78; R. B. Smith, 
“The Cycle of Confucianization in Vietnam,” in Aspects of Vietnam History, ed. 
Walter F. Vella (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973), pp.1‒29; John K. 
Whitmore, “Social Organization and Confucian Thought in Vietnam,”Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 15.2 (September 1984), pp.296‒306. On Korean 
Neo-Confucianism, see Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, passim; and especially 
The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun 
Kim Haboush (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
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with her cultural neighbors. I would like to go one step further and to argue, 
though, that little light is shed on our understanding of China’s historical 
development by comparing this or that element or institution with some 
superﬁ cially similar element or institution outside the Sinic cultural sphere. If 
one is looking for reasons to explain why China failed to develop along 
Western lines, then comparisons with the West would certainly be in order; 
however, such questions are fundamentally self-serving and at best turn up 
conclusions of a highly dubious quality.
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Introduction: My Route into Asian Studies
My route into Asian studies is about as normal as it would have been unpre-
dictable beforehand. As a third-generation American—all of my grandparents 
were immigrants from Eastern Europe in the second decade of the twentieth 
century—I was neither the ﬁ rst person in my family to get a B.A. nor even a 
Ph.D. I was, however, the ﬁ rst person to become interested in the history and 
culture of East Asia. Because there was such a bookish culture in my family, 
though, it was never seen as an unusual pursuit; in fact, I’m certain that my 
lefty parents were thrilled that one of theirs was studying China, given what 
was for them the exciting events in the years immediately preceding my birth 
in 1950. In fact, many people have commented (and occasionally reached 
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some far-fetched conclusions) about the natural ties between Chinese and 
Jews. I personally don’t buy any of it, though of course I respect their right 
to have silly views.
 Although born in Brooklyn, New York, I grew up from age seven in 
Berkeley, California precisely in those now famous years of political turmoil 
and excitement. Mine was a politically active, left-of-center family, and that 
meant countless marches and rallies for the important causes of the day: the 
civil rights movement, the movement in opposition to the American war in 
Viet Nam War, and many spin-oﬀ s of both. I spent my college years at the 
University of Chicago (1968‒1972), continuing in those same activities and 
there developing a keen interest in modern China.
 At the University of Chicago, I studied ﬁ rst with the late Professor Tang 
Tsou in the political science department and later with Philip Kuhn and Akira 
Iriye in history. In 1972 I entered graduate school at Columbia University 
where I initially studied with C. Martin Wilbur and, upon his retirement, with 
Wm. Theodore de Bary. During those years, I studied Chinese (from 1970) 
and then Japanese (from 1973) relentlessly, day and night. Americans were 
unable to study in China throughout most of the 1970s, so that was still a 
romantic, though never actually a practical, desideratum. Columbia had a 
rather draconian language requirement (long since watered down), and thus I 
had taken the equivalent of a fair number of years of both Chinese and 
Japanese language (including summers) by the time I was searching for a 
thesis topic.
 I forget who ﬁ rst suggested the topic of Naitō Konan (1866‒1934), the 
great Japanese Sinologist, but I jumped at the suggestion. The next thing I 
knew I was reading my ﬁ rst book in Japanese, cover to cover, a biography of 
Naitō by one of his last students, Mitamura Taisuke of Ritsumeikan 
University. And, in late 1976 I was oﬀ  on my ﬁ rst trip to Asia with support 
from the Fulbright Foundation and later from the Japanese Ministry of 
Education. I spent roughly eighteen months at Kyoto University, where Naitō 
had pioneered Chinese studies at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
reading through his works, soaking up as much of the Sinological world of 
Kyoto University as possible, and interviewing Naitō’s last students. I also 
made some of my best friends among the students of that generation in 
Kyoto at the time.
 Historical studies were in those days largely compartmentalized by 
nations. The idea of crossing borders and working on more than one national 
entity at the same time was not frowned upon, but it was not exactly encour-
aged either—anywhere in the world. Diplomatic historians at least paid lip 
service to working in multiple archives and multiple languages, but in reality 
few historians, diplomatic or otherwise, working in the West were actually 
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doing that. Professor Iriye was one of those few and a great inspiration to 
me.
 Many times over the years I have been asked, in East Asia as well as the 
West, if I am ﬁ rst and foremost a historian of China or Japan. The answer I 
like to give—and usually do—is that I don’t make that distinction. I explain 
that I pick topics that cross the  Sino-Japanese border and go where the 
research necessitates I go. We now have the language of “border-crossing” 
and “global studies” and even “globalization,” but that is a relative recent 
addition to the historian’s lexicon.
 But, once I sensed the wealth of fascinating but still unstudied topics in 
Sino-Japanese interactions, I was an immediate convert. Subsequent research 
topics and books included: the life and work of a Japanese expatriate in 
China (Nakae Ushikichi, 1889‒1942); Japanese travel writings about China 
(1862‒1945); the Japanese community of Shanghai; Japanese historiography 
(1784–present) concerning the gold seal presented by the founding emperor 
of the Later Han dynasty in 57 CE to an emissary from somewhere in that 
space we now call Japan and soon lost before being found in the late eigh-
teenth century; and most recently, the voyage of the Senzaimaru in 1862 and 
the restarting of Sino-Japanese diplomatic and commercial relations in the 
modern era. Many run-ups to and spin-oﬀ s from these (and other) projects are 
represented in the essays that follow in this collection.
 In 1988 I called together a small group which met in my hotel room at 
the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, and we formed the 
Sino-Japanese Studies Group. There were only about ﬁ fteen of us at the 
time—Sherman Cochran reassured me that there were fewer participants at 
the ﬁ rst national congress of the Chinese Communist Party—and we weren’t 
exactly sure what we wanted to do, but we agreed that we would try to meet 
each year in conjunction with the AAS meetings and that I would launch the 
Sino-Japanese Studies Newsletter. It was to come out twice annually. I then 
sent out hundreds of announcements for subscriptions to this new periodical, 
and we were oﬀ . After two issues, we dropped “Newsletter” from the title. 
Aside from a short hiatus, we have been bringing SJS out ever since. It is now 
free and online (www.chinajapan.org), and articles are posted as they are run 
through the reviewing mill and accepted.
 I began my teaching career at Harvard University (1981‒1988) at a time 
when there was no normal route to tenure candidacy there. I then moved to 
the University of California at Santa Barbara (1989‒2005). My position in the 
History Department there was deﬁ ned as “comparative East Asianist,” a 
designation I was extremely proud to ﬂ aunt. During that time I was blessed 
with a one-year visiting professorship at Kyoto University’s prestigious 
Institute for Research in the Humanities (Jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo) and 
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blessed again with a two-year visiting professorship (2001‒2003) at the 
School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New 
Jersey. In 2005 I took up my present Canada Research Chair at York 
University in Toronto.
 I had hoped that the kind of “border-crossing” that my research entails 
would become a broader trend than it has in the larger world of East Asian 
studies. The systemic problems remain: diﬃ  cult languages, institutional pres-
sures to work on one country at a time, latent anti-Japanese feelings in the 
China ﬁ eld, and the like. In fact, many people have overcome these disabili-
ties, though not all of them have come rushing to do inter-East Asian studies. 
I personally remained convinced that the modern histories of the two entities 
we now called “China” and “Japan” (to say nothing of “Taiwan” and “Hong 
Kong”) are so inextricably intertwined that one has to take the other into 
account when studying virtually any topic. Before the middle of the nine-
teenth century, this statement is more diﬃ  cult to sustain, but there are those 
who are so convinced.
 The essays in this collection represent work I have done over the past 
thirty-plus years, from my last days as a graduate student in the late 1970s 
through more recent times. The ﬁ eld of Sino-Japanese studies as I understand 
it can be roughly divided into comparative history and the history of interac-
tions. Most of these essays take up the latter theme, though some address the 
former or employ both approaches.
